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1. lntroducfion 
In this paper. we address on privacy issues ofSkype cal ls. With 
the rapid growth of broadband Internet access services, the popu-
larity of VolP calls has grown significantly. As a competitor with 
traditional phone services provided over Public Switched Telephone 
Networks ( PSTN ). VolP services are known for their lower cost and 
rIcher Features. Skype Is one of tile most popular VolP service 
providers. 
Skype VolP services are provided on a peer-ta-peer structure. 
Skype peers form an overlay network. A Skype call may be routed 
through Skype peers during the call for better Qual ity of Service 
(QoS) [1.2J. One of the main reasons for the popularity of Skype 
VolP services is its unique set of feature s to protect privacy ofVolP 
calls such as strong encryption [3J. proprietary protocols [3). un-
known codecs [4). and dynamic path selection I (1.2). and the con-
stant packet rate [5). To further protect privacy of Skype VolP calls. 
advanced users are using anonymity networks to anonymize VolP 
calls. For this purpose. low-latency anonymity networks such as 
Tor [6) and JAP [7) can be used. 
In this paper. we propose a class of passive traffic analysis 
attacks to compromise privacy of Skype calls. The procedure of 
the proposed attacks is as follows: First an adversary collects Skype 
call traces made by a victim. say Alice. The adversary then extracts 
application-level features of Alice's VolP calls and trains a Hidden 
Markov Model (HMM ) with the extracted features. To test whether 
a call of interest is made by Alice. the adversary can extract fea-
tures from the trace of the call and calculate likelihood of the call 
being made by Alice. The proposed attacks can identify speeches 
or speakers of Skype calls with high probabilities. 
The contributions made in this paper are summarized as 
follows: 
• .we propose a class of trartlc analysis attacks to compromi se pri-
vacy of Skype calls. The attacks are passive and based on the 
HMM. a powerful tool to model temporal data. We also propose 
a method to extract application-level features from traffic flows 
for application-level traffic analysis attacks. 
• .we evaluate the proposed traffic analysis attacks through 
extensive experiments over the Internet and commercial 
anonymity networks. For most of Skype calls made in the 
experiments. the two parties are at least 20 hops away and 
the end-to-end delay between two parties is at least 80 ms. 
Our experiments show that the traffic analysis attacks are able 
to detect speeches or speakers of Skype calls with high 
probabilities. 
• .we propose intersection attacks to improve the effectiveness of 
the proposed attacks. 
• .we propose a countermeasure to mitigate the proposed traffic 
analysis attacks and analyze the effect of the countermeasure 
on quality of Skype ca ll s. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews 
related work. In Section 3. we formally define the problem. The de-
ta ils of proposed tra ffic analysis a ttacks a re described in Section 4. 
In Section 5. we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed traffic 
analysis attacks with experiments on commercialized anonymity 
networks and our campus network. Section 7 presents a counter­
measure to mitigate the proposed traffic analysis attacks. Discus­
sion and the outline of future work are given in Section 8. We  
conclude the paper in Section 9. 
2. Related work 
In this section, we review related work on low-latency anonym­
ity networks and related traffic analysis attacks. 
2.1. Low-latency anonymity networks 
After Chaum proposed the anonymous communication for 
email in his seminal paper [8], many low-latency anonymity net­
works have been proposed or even implemented for different 
applications. The examples are ISDN-mixes [9] for telephony, Web 
Mix [7] for web browsing, MorphMix [10] for peer-to-peer applica­
tions, GAP base GNUnet [11] for file sharing. TARZAN [12], Onion 
Router [13], and Tor [6], the second-generation onion router, are 
designed for general usage by low-latency applications. Especially 
Tor has some desirable features for low-latency applications such 
as perfect forward secrecy and congestion control. In our experi­
ments, we used the anonymity network managed by findnot.com 
to anonymize VoIP calls instead of the Tor network, because UDP 
traffic is not natively supported by Tor. The commercialized anon­
ymous communication services provided by findnot.com can allow 
us to route VoIP packets through entry points located in different 
countries into the anonymity network. 
Common techniques used in low-latency anonymity networks 
are encryption and re-routing. Encryption prevents packet content 
access by adversaries. To confuse adversaries, anonymity networks 
using re-routing techniques forward encrypted packets in a usually 
longer and random path instead of using the shortest path between 
the sender and the receiver. To attack an anonymity network using 
the re-routing technique, the attacker usually needs to be more 
powerful, for example, to be a global attacker. 
2.2. Traffic analysis attacks 
Traffic analysis attacks can be classified into two categories, 
network-level traffic analysis attacks and application-level traffic 
analysis attacks. 
Network-level traffic analysis attacks target at disclosing net­
work-level or transport-level information. Most privacy-related 
network-level traffic analysis attacks focus on traffic flow identifi­
cation or traffic flow tracking. The examples are attacks by Levine 
et al. [14] on anonymity networks, the active attack proposed by 
Murdoch and Danezis [15] on the Tor network, our flow correlation 
[16], and our flow separation [17] attacks. 
Application-level traffic analysis attacks target at disclosing 
application-level information. The examples are keystroke detec­
tion based on packet timing [18], web page identification [19], 
spoken phrase identification [20] with variable bit rate codecs. 
The traffic analysis attacks proposed in this paper are at 
application-level. These attacks can detect speeches or speakers 
of Skype calls based on talk patterns, the application-level features 
which do not vary from call to call. 
There are a number of research efforts focusing on traffic 
analysis of VoIP. Wang et al. [24] proposed to watermark VoIP traf­
fic flows to trace VoIP calls through the Internet. In [21], Wright 
et al. showed that it was possible to recover spoken phrases from 
VoIP packet size information. Wright et al. [22] also showed the 
feasibility to detect languages used in VoIP conversations based 
on VoIP packet size information. 
Similar as [21,22], our research in this paper focuses on disclos­
ing application-level information from traffic analysis of VoIP. The 
traffic analysis attacks proposed in this paper aim to identify 
speakers of VoIP calls. Another difference is on the type of VoIP 
codecs and protocols. The researches in [21,22] focus on a variable 
bit rate (VBR) codec, more specifically the open-source Speex codec 
[23], and standardized VoIP protocols. We focus on the Skype VoIP 
service which uses codecs unknown to the public and its own pro­
prietary protocols. Skype is also known for its strong encryption 
preventing packet content access. These privacy protection mea­
sures taken by Skype render traffic analysis on Skype VoIP traffic 
more difficult since (1) we have to treat the Skype software as a 
black box and (2) we are not even able to identify signaling packets 
so that these signaling packets can be completely removed before 
traffic analysis.2 
3. Problem definition 
In this paper, we focus on traffic analysis on Skype VoIP calls 
through anonymity networks to disclose sensitive information at 
application-level. More specifically, we are interested in detecting 
speeches and speakers of Skype VoIP calls by analyzing traffic pat­
terns at the application-level. 
A typical attack scenario focused in this paper is as follows: An 
adversary who has possession of traces of previous Skype VoIP calls 
made by a victim, say Alice, may want to detect whether Alice is 
talking to Bob now by collecting Skype packets on the link to 
Bob. The adversary may also want to detect the speech content, 
such as the repetition of a partial speech in previous Skype calls. 
In this paper, we assume that traffic traces used in analysis can 
be collected at different time. This is the major difference between 
our research and the previous researches. Most of the previous re­
searches assume that the adversary has simultaneous access to both 
links connected to Alice and Bob during the Skype call between Alice 
and Bob. By passively correlating VoIP flows at both ends or ac­
tively watermarking VoIP flows, the adversary can detect whether 
Alice is communicating with Bob. But for the typical attack sce­
nario described above, both flow correlation and watermarking 
techniques do not work because traces to be compared are col­
lected from different VoIP calls: (a) Correlation between different 
calls is low. (b) Watermarks used to mark traffic flows of Alice’s 
VoIP calls can be different for different calls because of recycling 
watermarks or simply because Alice is making a call from a differ­
ent location or with a different computer. 
3.1. Network model 
In the paper, we assume Alice makes VoIP calls by Skype. We 
are particularly interested in Skype VoIP calls because: (a) Skype 
is based on peer-to-peer structure. During a Skype call, VoIP pack­
ets may follow more than one path through different Skype peers 
or Skype supernodes [1]. The peer-to-peer structure and dynamic 
path selection make security attacks or eavesdropping on Skype 
calls more difficult. (b) Skype uses proprietary protocols so that 
attackers cannot differentiate media packets from signaling pack­
ets. (c) Skype uses unknown codecs that renders traffic analysis 
exploiting characteristics of voice codecs nearly impossible [4]. 
(d) Skype calls are encrypted and hard to decipher [3]. (e) Skype 
sends packets at the constant rate of 33 packet/s [5]. Due to the un­
ique set of features listed above, Skype is known as secure voice 
2 In general, signaling packets are not affected by talk patterns so signaling packets 
are essentially ‘‘noise’’ in recovering talk patterns from Skype traffic. Signaling packets 
are not considered in [21,22] since these packets can be filtered out easily for 
standardized VoIP calls. In other words, patterns recovered from VoIP traffic in [21,22] 
are noise-free. 
communication [3] which can protect privacy of communication 
parties. 
As shown in Fig. 1, we assume Alice routes Skype calls through 
anonymity networks to further protect privacy of her Skype calls. 
For better voice quality, Alice can use low-latency anonymity net­
works such as Tor and JAP. 
3.2. Threat model 
We focus on passive attacks in this paper. In other words, the 
attacks launched by the adversary do not disturb the existing net­
work traffic. In comparison with active traffic analysis attacks 
[15,24], the proposed attacks are harder to detect. 
We assume that the adversary only has access to the links 
directly connected to participants of VoIP calls. This assumption 
is widely used in traffic analysis attacks such as attacks on ano­
nymity networks [15]. We do not assume the adversary as a global 
attacker because re-routing techniques used in anonymity 
networks and dynamic path selection employed by Skype make 
global attacks too costly to be practical. 
Our threat model does not require simultaneous access to the 
links connected to participants of a VoIP call since it may not be 
feasible for long-distance calls, such as international calls. Instead 
we assume the adversary can collect traces of VoIP calls made by 
Alice in advance and use these collected traces to detect whether 
Alice is a participant in the VoIP conversation of interest. Our mod­
el is similar as the model for identifying a human being by finger­
prints: Fingerprints of human beings are collected in advance 
through driver license applications. To identify a specific person, 
the fingerprint of interest such as a fingerprint in a crime scene will 
be compared against the person’s fingerprints collected in advance. 
The threat model assumes the detections are based on different 
Skype calls. So the speaker identification should also be indepen­
dent of the voice content of Skype calls. 
4. Detecting speech and speaker of skype-based VoIP calls 
In this section, we describe traffic analysis attacks to detect 
speeches or speakers of encrypted VoIP calls. We begin the section 
with an overview of the proposed traffic analysis attack and details 
of each step in our algorithm are described after the overview. 
4.1. Overview 
The proposed traffic analysis attacks are based on packet size 
information. A simple experiment shown in Fig. 2 indicates that 
packet size information can disclose speech-level information. 
Fig. 2(a) shows an audio signal with three silence periods. 
Fig. 2(b) shows the packet sequence generated by feeding the 
audio signal into Skype clients. From the packet sequence plotted 
in Fig. 2(b), we can observe: (a) Even during silent periods, Skype 
clients still generate packets at a constant rate. (b) During silent 
periods, VoIP packets generated by Skype are small in comparison 
with packets generated during talk periods. We do not focus on 
packet timing information in this paper mainly because Skype cli­
ents send VoIP packets at a constant rate [5]. 
Fig. 1. Network model. 
One of the challenges in this paper is to extract application-level 
features from collected VoIP packet traces, i.e., features existing in 
different VoIP calls. Based on the features existing in different VoIP 
calls, traffic analysis attacks can possibly detect speeches or speak­
ers of VoIP calls. The feature used in the proposed attacks is the 
throughput vector [s1, s2, . . . , sn], where n is the length of the vector. 
The element si in the throughput vector is calculated as follows: 
sum of bytes received or sent during the ith sample interval 
si ¼ T 
ð1Þ 
where T is the length of sample intervals. 
The length of sample interval T should be selected in the order 
of seconds for the following two reasons: (a) Because of re-routing 
techniques used in anonymity networks and dynamic path selec­
tion employed in Skype, VoIP packets can arrive at destination in 
an order different from the order at sending end. A larger sample 
interval can largely absorb the difference. This is also the reason 
why we do not use per-packet size as the feature vector. (b) Talk 
patterns are of low frequency while network dynamics is of higher 
frequency. Network dynamics is usually in the order of millisecond 
while the patterns such as silent periods are in the order of seconds 
[25]. The averaging effect of sample intervals is equivalent as low-
pass filtering. A larger sample interval in the order of seconds can 
filter out network dynamics information which can vary from call 
to call and keep the low-frequency talk patterns. 
A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) based classifier is used to de­
tect speeches or speakers of VoIP calls. The HMM is a well-known 
tool to model temporal data and it has been successfully used in 
temporal pattern recognition such as speech recognition [26], 
handwriting recognition [27], and gesture recognition [28]. In the 
proposed attacks, HMMs are trained to model talk patterns. 
The proposed attacks can be divided into two phases: The train­
ing phase and the detection phase as shown in Fig. 3. The two steps 
in the training phase are feature extraction and HMM training. The 
detection phase consists of three steps: Feature extraction, speech 
detection or speaker detection, and intersection attack. The last 
step, intersection attack, is optional. We describe the details of 
each step below. 
4.2. Feature extraction 
The input and output of the feature extraction step are raw 
traces of Skype calls and throughput vectors, respectively. 
Two parameters are used in this step to control the generation 
of throughput vectors: (a) Length of sample interval T: As  
described in Section 4.1, the length of sample interval should be 
large enough to filter out network dynamics different from call 
to call and keep talk patterns. At the same time, it is desired to se­
lect a sample interval small enough so that throughput vectors are 
long enough for the training purpose. (b) Threshold on packet size 
Hpacket: The threshold is used to filter out signaling packets and 
excluding signaling packets can lead to better trained HMMs of talk 
patterns. Since Skype uses proprietary protocols, unknown codecs, 
and encryption, it is impossible to separate signaling packets based 
on protocol headers. We heuristically differentiate signaling pack­
ets from media packets by the threshold Hpacket: Signaling packets 
are usually smaller than media packets. In raw VoIP traces, we also 
find that packets of small and fixed sizes are sent or received peri­
odically and independent of speech activities. The guidelines on 
the choice of these two parameters are given in Section 5. 
4.3. HMM training 
The input and output of this step are throughput vectors and 
trained HMMs respectively. 
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Fig. 3. Steps of the proposed attacks. 
The Markov Model is a tool to model a stochastic process with 
the Markov property that the transition from the current state to 
the next state depends only on the current state, i.e., independent 
from the past states. In a Hidden Markov Model, the state is not di­
rectly visible, but outputs influenced by the state are observed. 
Each state has a probability distribution over the possible outputs. 
Therefore the sequence of outputs generated by an HMM gives 
some information about the sequence of states. A nice introduction 
of Hidden Markov Model can be found in [29]. 
In the proposed attacks, HMMs are trained to model talk pat­
terns used for speech detection or speaker detection. More specif­
ically, the attacks are based on on–off patterns of silence in 
speeches which have been used as one feature for speaker detec­
tion [30]. As shown in Fig. 2, the on–off patterns in speeches can 
be possibly recovered from packet size. But the pattern recovery 
is noisy because: (a) It is impossible to differentiate voice packets 
from signaling packets. (b) A sample interval may contain several 
on–off periods or may be a part of a long silent gap or talk spurt. 
Ideally only two states, talk and silence, are enough to model talk 
patterns with a voice silence detector as used in [30]. Because of 
the noise in pattern recovery, more states of different combina­
tions of on–off periods are used in the HMM. We heuristically set 
the number of states in the HMM to be eight according to the 
length of throughput vectors. The HMM used in traffic analysis 
attacks is the left–right HMM [29] as shown in Fig. 4. The left–right 
model, also called as a Bakis model [31,32], has the property that 
the stat index is non-decreasing with the time. In other words, 
where ai,j denotes the state transition probability from the ith state 
to the jth state and the zero transition probability means that the 
transition from the ith state to the jth state is prohibited if j < i as 
shown in Fig. 4. The left–right model also requires that 
 
1; i ¼ 1 
pi ¼ ð3Þ 0; i – 1
where pi denotes the initial state probability for the ith state. In 
other words, the left–right model mandates that the state sequence 
starts from the first state. We choose the left–right model because 
of the nonergodic nature of speech signals [29], i.e., the attribute 
of signals whose properties change over time. Each node in Fig. 4 
represents a state in one sample interval. The observable variable 
is the throughput of each sample interval. 
Two kinds of HMMs can be trained: (a) For the speech detection, 
we focus on detecting speeches made by one specific speaker, say 
Alice. So a speech-specific model can be obtained by training the 
model with traces of the same speeches made by Alice. (b) A 
speaker-specific model can be obtained by training the HMM with 
ai;j ¼ 0; when j < i ð2Þ Fig. 4. A left–right Hidden Markov Model. 
Fig. 5. Experiment setup. 
traces of VoIP calls made by a specific speaker. The trained HMMs 
are used in the following speech detection or speaker detection. 
4.4. Speech detection and speaker detection 
The inputs to this step are the Alice’s speech-specific or Alice’s 
speaker-specific HMM trained in the previous step and throughput 
vectors generated from a candidate pool of raw VoIP traces of 
interest. The output of this step is the intermediate detection re­
sult. For the speaker detection, the intermediate detection result 
is Ktop speakers from the candidate pool with talk patterns closest 
to Alice’s talk pattern. For the speech detection, the intermediate 
detection result is Ktop speeches from the candidate pool with 
speech patterns closest to talk patterns in training traces. 
The detection step can be divided into two phases: (a) First, the 
likelihood of each throughput vector is calculated with the trained 
HMM. (b) The trace with the highest likelihood is declared as the 
trace generated from a specific speech by Alice if intersection at­
tack is not used. To improve detection accuracy, the intermediate 
detection results can be fed into the optional step, intersection 
attack. 
4.5. Intersection attack 
The intersection step is designed to improve detection accuracy. 
The input to this step is the intermediate detection result from the 
previous step. The output is a final detection result. 
The main idea of the intersection attack is similar as described 
in [33–35]: Instead of deciding the detection result based on one 
trial, we can improve detection accuracy by a number of trials 
and the final detection result is determined by combining (or inter­
secting) the results from each trial. 
More specifically, for the proposed attacks, suppose it is possi­
ble to get m Skype call traces made by the same speaker, the adver­
sary can do m trials as described in Section 4.4. From each 
detection, the adversary can obtain k traces with the Ktop highest 
likelihoods. The overall rank for each speaker is calculated by add­
ing ranks in m trials. The speaker with the highest rank is deter­
mined to be Alice. Tie can be broken by comparing the sum of 
likelihood in m trials. 
5. Empirical evaluation 
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed 
detection. 
5.1. Experiment setup 
The experiment setup is as shown in Fig. 5. Skype packets are 
first directed to the anonymity network managed by findnot.com 
and then relayed by Skype peers or supernodes before arriving at 
the other end of the call. We use the commercial anonymous com­
munication services provided by findnot.com mainly because it is 
possible to select entry points into the anonymity network [36]. 
In our experiments, Skype packets were directed through entry 
points in England, Germany, and United States as shown in 
Fig. 5. For these Skype calls made through anonymity networks, 
the end-to-end delay is at least 80 ms and the two communication 
parties are at least 20 hops away from each other. About a quarter 
of calls are made through campus network so that traces of VoIP 
calls over a wide range of networks are available for our 
experiments. 
The audio signals are extracted from videos hosted on Research 
Channels [37] for consistent sound quality. The length of extracted 
audio signals about 38 min. At least three different speeches are 
available for most speakers and each speech was sent through at 
least four different network entry points.3 In total 180 Skype calls 
were made through different entry points of the anonymity net­
work managed by findnot.com and through the campus network. 
5.2. Metrics 
We use detection rate to measure effectiveness of the proposed 
attacks. In this paper, detection rate is defined as the ratio of the 
number of successful detections to the number of attempts. 
For both speech detection and speaker detection, the detection 
rate for random guess is about 1 , because in each trial, there are 169
169 candidate traces in the pool on average. One of the traces in 
the pool is the correct trace, i.e., the trace generated by a specific 
speech. In each trial of speech detection, three traces of the same 
speech are used for training and one trace of the same speech is 
one of the candidate traces. In each trial of speaker detection, 
one trace of Alice’s speech is used as one of the candidate traces 
and Alice’s other traces are used for training. 
In all the experiments below, the training traces and candidate 
traces are all collected from different Skype calls. For better train­
ing, all the traces used in training are collected from sending end, 
i.e., from the link connected to Alice’s computer. 
5.3. Effect of parameter T (length of sample interval) 
This series of experiments are designed to test the effect of the 
parameter T, length of sample interval. 
Fig. 6 shows the effect of the parameter T on speech detection. 
From these two figures, we can observe: (a) For a wide range of T, 
the detection rate is larger than 0.1, about 10-fold improvement 
over random guess. (b) When T is small, the detection rate is 
relatively low. It is because a small T cannot be used to extract talk 
pattern usually in the order of second as discussed in Section 4.1. 
(c) When T becomes large, the detection rate may drop simply 
because of shorter throughput vector used for training and 
detection. (d) The detection rate can be as high as 0.3, about 
50-fold improvement over random guess. (e) The detection rate 
for candidate traces collected from sending end is comparable with 
the detection rate for candidate traces collected from receiving 
end. It is because T is big enough to filter out network dynamics 
3 The campus network entry point is one of the choices. 
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Fig. 6. Effect of parameter T on speech detection. 
at receiving end which can vary from call to call. Similar observa­
tions can be made from Fig. 7. The detection rate for speaker detec­
tion can reach 0.18, about 30-fold improvement over random 
guess. 
5.4. Effect of parameter Hpacket (threshold on packet size) 
These series of experiments are designed to test the effect of the 
parameter Hpacket, threshold on packet size. 
Fig. 8 shows the effect of the parameter Hpacket on speech detec­
tion. From Fig. 8, we can observe: (a) When Hpacket is less than 100 
bytes, the detection rate is low. We believe it is because small 
Hpacket cannot be used to remove all signaling packets. (b) When 
Hpacket is larger than 130 bytes, the detection rate may decrease. 
The reason is too few packets are left because of the larger thresh­
old. (c) The detection rate for speech detection can achieve 0.32, 
about 55-fold improvement over random guess. 
Fig. 9 shows the effect of the parameter Hpacket on speaker detec­
tion. We can observe: (a) The best range of Hpacket for speaker 
detection is from 110 bytes to 130 bytes. (b) The detection rate 
can reach to 0.2, about 34-fold improvement over random guess. 
5.5. Length of training traces and test traces 
The length of training traces and test traces available for traffic 
analysis largely determines the effectiveness of proposed traffic 
0.2 
analysis. In this set of experiments, we evaluate performance of 
the proposed attacks with different lengths of training traces and 
test traces. Fig. 10 shows the experiment results on length of test 
traces. The results are obtained with training traces of length 
38.5 min, T = 110 s, and Hpacket = 120 bytes. We can observe that 
detection rates for both speaker detection and speech detection in­
crease with length of test traces. When test traces are 25 min long, 
the detection rates for speaker detection and speech detection are 
0.30 and 0.23, 50-fold and 39-fold improvement over random 
guess respectively. In this set of experiments, we also observe that 
speakers with similar talk patterns such as multiple similar seg­
ments of throughput vectors are misidentified as each other with 
higher probabilities than other speakers. When the length of train­
ing and test traces increases, the probability distribution of the 
misidentification is more close to the uniform distribution. We 
believe it is because (1) talk patterns from different speaker are 
different albeit of some similarities and (2) longer traces can better 
train the models to capture the difference. 
5.6. Pool size 
In this set of experiments, we investigate the performance of 
traffic analysis attacks with different size of candidate pool. From 
the experiments results shown in Fig. 11, we can observe that 
when pool size increases, the detection rate slightly decreases for 
both speech detection and speaker detection, since it is harder to 
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Fig. 7. Effect of parameter T on speaker detection. 
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find the right one from a larger candidate pool. But the ratio be- 5.7. Intersection attack 
tween the speech detection rate and random guess rate changes 
from 12.59 when pool size is 27–31.60 when pool size is 105, In this set of experiments, we evaluate the effectiveness of 
meaning the traffic analysis attacks are more effective when the intersection attacks on speaker detection. On average, there are 
pool size is large. 33 candidate speakers. So the detection rate for random guess is 
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about 1 . Each candidate speaker has 3 Skype traces available for 33
detection so the final detection result is obtained by combining 
the intermediate detection results of 3 trials. 
From previous experiments, we learned suitable ranges for 
parameters T and Hpacket to achieve higher detection rate. We use 
parameters in these ranges in the intersection attacks described 
below. 
Fig. 12 shows the performance of intersection attack. From 
Fig. 12, we can observe: (a) When Ktop, the number of most likely 
candidates selected from each trial, increases, in general the detec­
tion rate increases because more high-likelihood traces are consid­
ered in the intersection attack step. (b) The detection rate can 
reach 0.44, about 15-fold improvement over random guess. (c) 
The detection rate for candidate traces collected from sending 
end is again comparable with the detection rate for candidate 
traces collected from receiving end. 
In summary, the proposed traffic analysis attacks can signifi­
cantly improve the detection rate over random guess. We believe 
that given more training traces, higher detection rate can be 
achieved. Through cross-validation and averaging detection perfor­
mance over various parameters, we believe the detection results 
are generally applicable. 
6. False alarm evaluation of speaker detection 
In this section, we evaluate the proposed speaker detection with 
false alarm rates. For this purpose, we changed the threat model as 
follows: We assume that the adversary possesses traces of speech 
communications made by Alice and other speakers. We call these 
traces as labeled traces since these traces are collected in advance 
and the adversary knows the identities of speakers. The goal of the 
adversary is to detect, whether Alice is the speaker of a speech 
communication of interest. The major differences from the initial 
threat model are: (1) The initial threat model assumes that the 
adversary only possesses the Alice’s traces in advance. In the new 
threat model, the adversary possesses both Alice’s traces and other 
speakers’ traces in advance. (2) In the initial threat model, the 
adversary aims to find Alice’s trace from a pool of candidate traces 
based on Alice’s traces collected in advance. The goal of the adver­
sary in the new threat model is to detect whether a speech com­
munication of interest is made by Alice. 
6.1. Detection approach 
We modify the detection approach for the new traffic analysis 
attack as follows: 
1. The adversary splits the labeled traces of Alice’s speech commu­
nications into two halves. An HMM to model Alice’s talk pattern 
is established based on the first half of the traces. 
2. A detection threshold	 Ttol is determined based on remaining 
labeled traces including the second half of traces of Alice’s 
speech communications. The adversary evaluates each of these 
traces against Alice’s model and calculates its likelihood. Given 
a threshold Ttol, the false positive rate and the false negative rate 
on the remaining labeled traces can be calculated as follows: (a) 
False negative rate is defined as the proportion of Alice’s speech 
communications detected as speech communications made by 
other speakers, i.e., the proportion of Alice’s speech communi­
cations with likelihood values less than Ttol. (b) False positive 
rate is defined as the proportion of speech communications 
made by other speakers detected as Alice’s speech communica­
tions, i.e., the proportion of other speakers’ traces with likeli­
hood values larger than Ttol. The threshold Ttol is selected so 
that the detection rates on the remaining traces are maximized 
and both the false negative rate and the false positive rate on 
the remaining labeled traces are below a tolerance threshold 
Ttol. 
3. The adversary makes a detection decision by evaluating a given 
trace with Alice’s HMM. If the calculated likelihood is larger 
than Ttol, the given trace is declared as Alice’s trace. Otherwise, 
the trace is declared as a trace made by other speakers. 
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6.2. Performance evaluation 
We evaluate the detection performance with three metrics: False 
negative rate, false positive rate, and percentage of traces which can 
be tested. The two metrics, the false negative rate and the false posi­
tive rate used in performance evaluation, are calculated on the test 
traces. The last metric, percentage of traces which can be tested, is 
needed because for certain group of labeled traces, it is impossible 
to find a threshold Ttol so that both false negative rate and false posi­
tive rate on the labeled traces are below a given tolerance Ttol. In this 
set of experiments, the parameters are T = 110 s and Hpacket = 120 ­
bytes and the average length of labeled traces and test traces are 
39 min. The experiment results are averaged over all possible com­
binations of training traces and test traces. 
Experiment results shown in Fig. 13 indicate that false positive 
rate and false negative rate both increase when the tolerance Ttol 
increases as expected and in the mean time, the percentage of trace 
which can be tested increases. A smaller tolerance Ttol means better 
training, and in turn, better detection performance. A smaller toler­
ance Ttol also means stricter requirements so fewer traces can be 
tested. We can also observe that both false positive rate and false 
negative rate are below 0.2 when Ttol = 0.15 and around 60% traces 
can be tested. 
From Fig. 13, we can observe that both false alarm rate and false 
negative rate are larger than 0.1 when Ttotal P 0.1. In other words, 
the proposed detection approach is not very effective in practice 
when Ttotal P 0.1. But still the detection results indicate the a seri­
ous vulnerability: The detection rates much higher than the ran­
dom guess rate indicate that the detection approach can greatly 
reduce the anonymity of the Skype speech communications. 
7. Possible countermeasures 
From the discussion above, it is apparent that the proposed traf­
fic analysis attacks can greatly compromise the privacy of Skype 
calls. Countermeasures are needed to protect privacy of Skype 
calls. 
A naive countermeasure is to pad all the packets to the same 
size. We do not propose this countermeasure because: (a) A signif­
icant amount of bandwidth can be wasted to send padding bits. (b) 
Skype flows of constant packet sizes may catch special interest 
from adversaries. 
In the rest of this section, we introduce a countermeasure which 
can protect privacy at the cost of marginal effect on quality of VoIP 
calls. 
7.1. Skype camouflage 
The main idea of the countermeasure is to camouflage Alice’s 
Skype packets according to another speaker’s traces. As shown in 
Fig. 14, Alice’s Skype packets are re-packetized according to packet 
sizes of another speaker’s Skype packets. The re-packetization is 
controlled by the byte tokens generated according to packet size 
of Speaker X’s Skype packets: (1) When it is time to send Speaker 
X’s Skype packet of size v-byte, a v-byte token is generated to sig­
nal the re-packetization module to allow v-byte Skype payload 
stored in buffer to be transmitted. (2) If the buffer is empty, dum­
my packets will be sent to consume available byte tokens. During 
re-packetization, packet delimiters are added to the end of original 
packets and these re-packetized packets are encrypted with a ses­
sion key shared between both parties of the Skype call.4 
At the receiving end, the re-packetized packets are first de­
crypted with the session key and then converted to original Skype 
packets based on the packet delimiters. Recovered Skype packets 
are forwarded to the Skype client. 
7.2. Performance evaluation of the countermeasure 
We evaluate the countermeasure with two metrics: (a) The 
detection rate defined in Section 5-B: It is used to measure the per­
formance of preserving privacy of Skype calls. (b) Packet delay 
caused by the countermeasure: We use it to measure the degrada­
tion of quality of VoIP calls. 
In this set of experiments, we use real traces collected from the 
experiment environment described in Section 5.1. 
Fig. 15 shows the performance of the countermeasure. Fig. 15(a) 
shows that the countermeasure can preserve the privacy of Skype 
calls since the detection rate is around the probability of random 
guess. Fig. 15(b) shows the distribution of packet delay caused 
by the countermeasure. The mean of the delay caused by the coun­
termeasure is 0.10 ms. The delay is less than 0.102 ms with a prob­
ability larger than 0.95. So the delay caused by the countermeasure 
is negligible. In other words, the countermeasure will not cause 
any significant change in the quality of Skype calls since it is much 
less than the delay budget for VoIP calls [39]. 
In our experiments, we also find the delay caused by the 
countermeasure is smaller when Speaker X speaks more than Alice 
since more byte tokens are generated. So it is desired to 
4 The session key can be shared between both parties with Diffie–Hellman 
exchange as in Zphone [38]. 
Fig. 14. Countermeasure: camouflaging Alice’s Skype packets. 
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Fig. 15. Performance of the proposed countermeasure. 
camouflage Alice’s Skype calls with a Skype trace from a speaker 
who speaks more than Alice in phone calls. Our future work will 
focus on modeling the delay caused by the difference between 
Alice’s speech and Speaker X’s speech and providing a guideline 
on choosing Skype traces of Speaker X. 
8. Discussion and future work 
Our experiments clearly show that the proposed traffic analysis 
attacks can greatly compromise privacy of Skype calls. The detec­
tion rates for speech detection and speaker detection are 35-fold 
and 15-fold improvement over random guess. Aside from the inter­
section attack, a number of improvements could be made to for 
higher detection rates: (1) Adding more training traces or increas­
ing the length of training traces will improve detection perfor­
mance as shown in Fig. 10. Given the satisfactory results with 
only a small number of training traces, we leave the task of further 
improving performance of the traffic analysis attacks for future 
work. (2) We can also improve the detection performance by 
removing the noise in the talk pattern recovery. Since Skype uses 
proprietary protocols and strong encryption, it is not easy to differ­
entiate speech packets from signaling packets. In turn, the recov­
ered talk patterns are noisy. We plan to further analyze the 
Skype traffic and investigate approaches to separate out signaling 
packets to further improve detection performance. 
The traditional speaker detection problem assuming access to 
speech signals has been well studied [40]. In  [30], a speaker detec­
tion approach based on face, mouth motion, and silence detection 
is proposed. In comparison with the 90% high detection rate 
achieved in [30], our detection rate is relatively low simply because 
fewer features are available for traffic analysis and only noisy 
talk patterns recovered from packet sizes are available for traffic 
analysis. We plan to investigate the fundamental limits of the 
proposed attacks with only noisy talk patterns recovered from 
Skype traces in our future work. 
The framework proposed in this paper, including extracting 
application-level features from network traffic traces and statisti­
cal analysis of extracted application-level feature by the HMM, 
can be potentially used for other applications. For example, it can 
be used to detect cheating with game bots in on line gaming since 
game bots and human players play games in different ways so that 
their gaming patterns at the application layer are different. One of 
our future tasks is to explore the potential of the framework. 
9. Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose a class of passive traffic analysis 
attacks to compromise privacy of Skype VoIP calls. The proposed 
attacks are based on application-level features extracted from VoIP 
call traces. The proposed attacks are evaluated by extensive exper­
iments over different types of networks including commercialized 
anonymity networks and our campus network. The experiments 
show that the proposed traffic analysis attacks can greatly compro­
mise the privacy of Skype calls with only a small number of train­
ing traces. We propose a countermeasure to mitigate the proposed 
traffic analysis attacks by camouflaging. The proposed counter­
measure has negligible effect on quality of Skype calls. 
References 
[1] S.A. Baset, H.G. Schulzrinne, An analysis of the skype peer-to-peer internet 
telephony protocol, in: INFOCOM 2006. 25th IEEE International Conference on 
Computer Communications, Proceedings, 2006, pp. 1–11. Available from: 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOM.2006.312>. 
[2] P2p telephony explained	 – for geeks only. Available from: <http://www. 
skype.com/help/guides/p2pexplained/>. 
[3] T. Berson, Skype security evaluation, Tech. Rep. ALR-2005-031, Anagram 
Laboratories, 2005. 
[4] K.-T. Chen, C.-Y. Huang, P. Huang, C.-L. Lei, Quantifying Skype user satisfaction, 
(2006) 399–410. 
[5] M. Perényi, S. Molnár, Enhanced Skype traffic identification, in: ValueTools ’07: 
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Performance Evaluation 
Methodologies and Tools, ICST (Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-
Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering), ICST, Brussels, Belgium, 
Belgium, 2007, pp. 1–9. 
[6] R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, P. Syverson, Tor: the second-generation onion 
router, in: Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Security Symposium, San Diego, CA, 
2004, pp. 303–320. 
[7] O. Berthold, H. Federrath, S. Köpsell, Web MIXes: a system for anonymous and 
unobservable Internet access, in: H. Federrath (Ed.), Proceedings of Designing 
Privacy Enhancing Technologies: Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity 
and Unobservability, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2009, 2000, pp. 115–129. 
[8] D.L.	 Chaum, Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital 
pseudonyms, Communications of the ACM 24 (2) (1981) 84–90. Available 
from: <http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/358549.358563>. 
[9] A.	 Pfitzmann, B. Pfitzmann, M. Waidner, ISDN-mixes: untraceable 
communication with very small bandwidth overhead, in: Proceedings of the 
GI/ITG Conference on Communication in Distributed Systems, 1991, pp. 451– 
463. 
[10] M.	 Rennhard, B. Plattner, Introducing morphmix: peer-to-peer based 
anonymous internet usage with collusion detection, in: WPES ’02: 
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, 
ACM Press, New York, NY, USA, 2002, pp. 91–102. Available from: <http:// 
doi.acm.org/10.1145/644527.644537>. 
[11] K.	 Bennett, C. Grothoff, GAP – practical anonymous networking, in: R. 
Dingledine (Ed.), Proceedings of Privacy Enhancing Technologies Workshop 
(PET 2003), Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2760, 2003. 
[12] M.J. Freedman, R. Morris, Tarzan: A peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer, 
in: Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications 
Security, Washington, DC, 2002, pp. 193–206. Available from: <http:// 
doi.acm.org/10.1145/586110.586137>. 
[13] D.M.	 Goldschlag, M.G. Reed, P.F. Syverson, Hiding routing information, 
Information Hiding (1996) 137–150. 
[14] B.N. Levine, M.K. Reiter, C. Wang, M.K. Wright, Timing attacks in low-latency 
mix-based systems, in: Proceedings of Financial Cryptography (FC ’04), Key 
West, FL, 2004, pp. 251–265. 
[15] S.J. Murdoch, G. Danezis, Low-cost traffic analysis of Tor, in: Proceedings of the 
2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE CS, 2005. 
[16] Y. Zhu, X. Fu, B. Graham, R. Bettati, W. Zhao, Correlation-based traffic analysis 
attacks on anonymity networks, IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed 
Systems 99 (PrePrints). Available from: <http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/ 
10.1109/TPDS.2009.146>. 
[17] Y. Zhu, R. Bettati, Compromising anonymous communication systems using 
blind source separation, ACM Transactions on Information and System 
Security 13 (1) (2009) 1–31. Available from: <http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/ 
1609956.1609964>. 
[18] D.X. Song, D. Wagner, X. Tian, Timing analysis of keystrokes and timing attacks 
on ssh, in: SSYM’01: Proceedings of the 10th Conference on USENIX Security 
Symposium, USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2001, p. 25. 
[19] Q. Sun, D.R. Simon, Y.-M. Wang, W. Russell, V.N. Padmanabhan, L. Qiu, 
Statistical identification of encrypted web browsing traffic, in: IEEE 
Symposium on Security and Privacy, Society Press, 2002. 
[20] T.S. Saponas, J. Lester, C. Hartung, S. Agarwal, T. Kohno, Devices that tell on 
you: privacy trends in consumer ubiquitous computing, in: SS’07: Proceedings 
of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX 
Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2007, pp. 1–16. 
[21] C.V. Wright, L. Ballard, S.E. Coull, F. Monrose, G.M. Masson, Spot me if you can: 
uncovering spoken phrases in encrypted voip conversations, in: SP ’08: 
Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE 
Computer Society, Washington, DC, USA, 2008, pp. 35–49. Available from: 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SP.2008.21>. 
[22] C.V. Wright, L. Ballard, F. Monrose, G.M. Masson, Language identification of 
encrypted voip traffic: Alejandray roberto or alice and bob? in: SS’07: 
Proceedings of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security 
Symposium, USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2007, pp. 1–12. 
[23] Speex:a free codec for free speech. Available from: <http://www.speex.org/>, 
<http://www.speex.org/>. 
[24] X. Wang, S. Chen, S. Jajodia, Network flow watermarking attack on low-latency 
anonymous communication systems, in: SP ’07: Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE 
Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC. 
Available from: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SP.2007.30>. 
[25] W. Jiang, H. Schulzrinne, Analysis of on-off patterns in voip and their effect on 
voice traffic aggregation, in: Computer Communications and Networks, 2000, 
Proceedings. Ninth International Conference on, 2000, pp. 82–87. Available 
from: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICCCN.2000.885474>. 
[26] C.	 Rathinavelu, L. Deng, Hmm-based speech recognition using state-
dependent, linear transforms on mel-warped dft features, in: ICASSP ’96: 
Proceedings of the Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, 1996 on 
Conference Proceedings, 1996 IEEE International Conference, IEEE Computer 
Society, Washington, DC, USA, 1996, pp. 9–12. Available from: <http:// 
dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICASSP.1996.540277>. 
[27] M.-P. Schambach, Determination of the number of writing variants with an 
HMM based cursive word recognition system, in: ICDAR ’03: Proceedings of 
the Seventh International Conference on Document Analysis and Recognition, 
IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC, USA, 2003, p. 119. 
[28]	 An HMM-based approach for gesture segmentation and recognition, in: ICPR 
’00: Proceedings of the International Conference on Pattern Recognition, IEEE 
Computer Society, Washington, DC, USA, 2000, p. 3683. 
[29] L.R. Rabiner, A tutorial on hidden Markov models and selected applications in 
speech recognition, in: A. Waibel, K.-F. Lee (Eds.), Readings in Speech 
Recognition, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., San Francisco, CA, USA, 1990, 
pp. 267–296. 
[30] V. Pavlovic, J.M. Rehg, A. Garg, T.S. Huang, Multimodal speaker detection using 
error feedback dynamic bayesian networks, Computer Vision and Pattern 
Recognition, IEEE Computer Society Conference, vol. 2, 2000, p. 2034. Available 
from: <http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CVPR.2000.854730>. 
[31] F. Jelinek, Continuous speech recognition by statistical methods, Proceedings 
of the IEEE 64 (4) (1976) 532–556. 
[32] R. Bakis, Continuous speech recognition via centisecond acoustic states, The 
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 59 (S1) (1976) S97. Available 
from: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1121/1.2003011> <http://link.aip.org/link/?JAS/ 
59/S97/2>. 
[33] O. Berthold, A. Pfitzmann, R. Standtke, The disadvantages of free MIX routes 
and how to overcome them, in: Proceedings of Designing Privacy Enhancing 
Technologies: Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability, 
Berkeley, CA, 2000, pp. 30–45. 
[34] G. Danezis, A. Serjantov, Statistical disclosure	 or intersection attacks on 
anonymity systems, in: Proceedings of 6th Information Hiding Workshop (IH 
2004), Toronto, Canada, 2004, pp. 293–308. 
[35] O. Berthold, H. Langos, Dummy traffic against long term intersection attacks, 
in: Proceedings of Privacy Enhancing Technologies Workshop (PET 2002), San 
Francisco, CA, 2002, pp. 110–128. 
[36] FindnotProxyList. Available from: <http://www.findnot.com>. 
[37] ResearchChannels. Available from: <www.researchchannel.org>. 
[38] Zfone project home page. Available from: <http://zfoneproject.com/>. 
[39] T. Szigeti, C. Hattingh, End-to-End QoS Network Design: Quality of Service in 
LANs, WANs, and VPNs (Networking Technology), Cisco Press, 2004. 
[40] J.P. Campbell, Speaker recognition: a tutorial, Proceedings of the IEEE 85 (9) 
(1997) 1437–1462. Available from: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/5.628714 http:// 
dx.doi.org/10.1109/5.628714. 
